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Cultural  Change as Informational  Cascades 
Sushil Bikhchandani,  David Hirshleifer, 
and Ivo Welch 
University  of California, Los Angeles 
An informational  cascade  occurs  when it is optimal  for an individual, 
having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the 
behavior of the preceding individual  without regard to his own in- 
formation. We argue that localized conformity of behavior  and the 
fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational  cas- 
cades. 
Let them  alone:  they be blind leaders  of the blind. And 
if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch. 
[Matthew  15:14] 
I.  Introduction 
One  of  the  most  striking  regularities  of  human  society  is  localized 
conformity.  Americans  act American,  Germans  act German,  and Indi- 
We thank Daniel  Asquith,  Christopher  Barry, Gary S. Becker,  Michael J. Brennan, 
Colin  Camerer,  Darrell  Duffie,  Robert  Ellickson,  Dan  Friedman,  Stephen  J.  Gould, 
Jack  Hirshleifer,  David  Hull,  Timur  Kuran,  Steve  Lippman,  John  Mamer,  Hubert 
Markl, Robert  May, David  Nachman,  Jonathan  Paul, Tom  Philipson,  Ivan P. L. Png, 
Thomas  Schelling,  Max  Steuer,  Sheridan  Titman,  Gordon  Tullock,  the  editor,  two 
anonymous  referees,  the  members  of  the  Rational  Choice  seminar  at the  University 
of  Chicago,  and  seminar  participants  at  University  of  California,  Berkeley,  Hebrew 
University,  Jerusalem,  the  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  National  Taiwan 
University,  Northwestern  University,  the  University  of  Pittsburgh,  and the  University 
of  Utah  for  helpful  comments  and  discussions.  Parts of  this paper  subsume  parts of 
an earlier paper,  "Sequential Sales, Path Dependence,  and Cascades" (September  1989 
version)  by Welch. 
[Journal of Political Economy, 1992, vol.  100, no.  5] 
?  1992 by The  University  of  Chicago.  All rights reserved.  0022-3808/92/0005-0001$01.50 
992 INFORMATIONAL  CASCADES  993 
ans act Indian.  At  one  school  teenagers  take  drugs,  but  at another 
they "just say no." English  and  American  youths  enthusiastically  en- 
listed to fight in World War I, but pacifist sentiments  prevailed  prior 
to World War II and in the  1960s. 
Four primary mechanisms  have been  suggested  for uniform  social 
behavior:'  (1) sanctions on deviants,2 (2) positive payoff externalities,3 
(3) conformity  preference,4  and  (4) communication.5  The  first three 
theories  can  explain  why  society  may fix on  undesirable  choices,  or 
at least why the social outcome  may be history-dependent.  Sanctions 
can enforce  a malevolent  dictatorship,  payoff  externalities  can drive 
a better  technology  to  extinction  (e.g.,  the  beta  video  system),  and 
people  with  a direct  preference  for  conforming  may jump  on  the 
bandwagon  for  fairly  arbitrary  behavior  (e.g.,  bell-bottom  jeans). 
These  effects  tend  to bring  about  a rigid  conformity  that cannot  be 
broken by small shocks. Indeed,  the longer  the bandwagon  continues, 
the more  robust it becomes.  The  fourth  theory  implies  convergence 
toward the correct outcome  if communication  is credible and costless. 
It does  not explain  why mass behavior  is error-prone. 
None  of  these  theories  explains  why mass behavior  is often  fragile 
in the  sense  that  small  shocks  can  frequently  lead  to large  shifts  in 
behavior.6  For  example,  cohabitation  of  unmarried  couples  was 
viewed as scandalous  in the  1950s, was flaunted  in the  1960s, and was 
hardly noticed  in the  1980s. Colleges  in which students demonstrated 
and  protested  in  the  1960s  became  quiet  in  the  1980s.  The  recent 
rejection  of  communism  began  in  Poland  and  later  spread  rapidly 
among  other  Eastern  European  countries.  Religious  movements,  re- 
vivals, and  reformations,  started  by a few  zealots,  sometimes  sweep 
across populations  with astonishing  rapidity. Addiction  to and social 
attitudes  associated  with  alcohol,  cigarettes,  and  illegal  drugs  have 
fluctuated  widely. 
This  paper  offers  an explanation  not only of why people  conform 
but  also  of  why  convergence  of  behavior  can  be  idiosyncratic  and 
l Boyd  and  Richerson  (1985)  examine  several  general  models  of  cultural  transmis- 
sion that could be consistent  with these mechanisms.  Becker (1991) analyzes conformity 
in product  demand  in a model  that is also consistent  with several of these mechanisms. 
2 See,  e.g.,  Akerlof  (1980),  Bendor  and  Mookherjee  (1987),  Coleman  (1987), 
Hirshleifer  and  Rasmusen  (1989),  and  Kuran (1989). 
3 See,  e.g.,  Schelling  (1960,  1978),  Dybvig  and  Spatt  (1983),  Farrell  and  Saloner 
(1986),  Katz and  Shapiro  (1986),  and  Arthur  (1989).  For example,  conventions  such 
as driving on  the  right-  (or left-)  hand  side of  the road are self-enforcing,  once  a few 
individuals  follow  the convention. 
4  InJones  (1984),  individuals  inherently  wish to conform  with the behavior of others. 
3 Conformity  can be achieved  if early individuals  explain  the benefits  of alternatives 
to later ones  (see,  e.g.,  Rogers  1983). 
6 In Kuran (1989),  sanction-enforced  behavior for specific sets of exogenous  parame- 
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fragile.  In our  model,  individuals  rapidly converge  on one  action on 
the  basis  of  some  but  very  little  information.  If  even  a  little  new 
information  arrives,  suggesting  that  a different  course  of  action  is 
optimal, or if people  even suspect that underlying  circumstances  have 
changed  (whether  or not they really have), the social equilibrium  may 
radically shift.  Our  model,  which  is based on what we call "informa- 
tional  cascades,"  explains  not  only  conformity  but  also  rapid  and 
short-lived  fluctuations  such as fads, fashions,  booms,  and crashes. In 
the theories  of  conformity  discussed  earlier,  small shocks lead to big 
shifts in mass behavior  only if people  happen  to be very close to the 
borderline  between  alternatives.  Informational  cascades explain  why 
society,  on  the  basis of  little information,  will systematically  tend  to 
land close to the borderline,  causing  fragility. 
An informational  cascade occurs when  it is optimal  for an individ- 
ual,  having  observed  the  actions  of  those  ahead  of  him,  to  follow 
the behavior  of  the  preceding  individual  without  regard  to his own 
information.  Consider  the submission  of this paper to a journal.  The 
referee  will read  the  paper,  assess its quality, and accept or reject it. 
Suppose  that a referee  at a second journal  learns that the paper  was 
previously  rejected.  Under  the  assumption  that  the  referee  cannot 
assess the  paper's quality perfectly,  knowledge  of  the prior rejection 
should tilt him toward rejection.  Suppose  now that the second journal 
also rejects and  that when  the  paper  is submitted  to a third journal, 
the third  referee  learns  that the  paper  was rejected  at two previous 
journals.  Clearly, this further  raises the chance  of  rejection. 
In a fairly general  setting  with sequential  choices,  we show that at 
some  stage a decision  maker  will ignore  his private information  and 
act only on  the  information  obtained  from  previous  decisions.  Once 
this stage  is reached,  his decision  is uninformative  to others.  There- 
fore,  the  next  individual  draws the  same  inference  from  the history 
of  past decisions;  thus  if his signal is drawn independently  from  the 
same distribution  as previous  individuals',  this individual  also ignores 
his own information  and  takes the  same action as the previous  indi- 
vidual.  In  the  absence  of  external  disturbances,  so do  all later indi- 
viduals. 
The  paper  submission  example  is special  in that only one journal 
can accept  the  paper,  ending  the  submission  process.  Thus  the only 
possible cascade  that can arise is one  of rejection.  In many situations 
cascades  can  be  either  positive-wherein  all individuals  adopt-or 
negative-wherein  all individuals  reject. Consider  a teenager  decid- 
ing  whether  or  not  to  experiment  with  drugs.  A  strong  motive  for 
experimenting  with drugs  is the  fact that friends  are doing  so. Con- 
versely,  seeing  friends  reject drugs  could  help  persuade  a youth  to 
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Although  the outcome  may or may not be socially desirable,  a rea- 
soning  process  that takes into  account  the  decisions  of  others  is en- 
tirely rational even  if individuals  place no value on conformity  for its 
own  sake.  Imitation  is, of  course,  an important  social phenomenon, 
as has been  documented  by numerous  studies  in zoology,  sociology, 
and social psychology.  Our contribution  is to model  the dynamics  of 
imitative decision  processes  as informational  cascades. 
We examine  (1) how likely it is that a cascade occurs, (2) how likely 
it is that the  wrong  cascade  occurs  (can a good  paper  be unpublish- 
able?),  (3)  how  fashions  change  (why  were  college  students  of  the 
1980s  pre-business  "achievers," whereas  those  in  the  1960s  flirted 
with  "alternative cultures"?), and  (4) how  effective  are public  infor- 
mation  releases  (e.g.,  a campaign  to  publicize  the  health  effects  of 
smoking). 
There  are  several  related  papers  in  which  private  information 
causes individuals  to imitate the actions of others.  In Conlisk's (1980) 
evolutionary  model,  optimizers-who  incur  a decision  cost-coexist 
with imitators-who  avoid  this  cost but  make  inferior  decisions  be- 
cause of observational  lags. Welch  (1992)  examines  the likelihood  of 
cascades  and  optimal  pricing  in  the  market  for  initial  public  stock 
offerings.7  Banerjee  (in press) independently  models  "herd behavior" 
as cascades. Conceptually,  our paper differs  from Welch's and Baner- 
jee's in emphasizing  the fragility of cascades with respect to different 
types of  shocks; cascades  can explain  not only uniform  behavior  but 
also drastic change  such as fads.8 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  II 
presents  the basic model,  shows that cascades can often  be mistaken, 
and  provides  conditions  under  which  a  cascade  will  almost  surely 
start. It then  examines  how a few early individuals  can have a dispro- 
portionate  effect  and  how  small  parameter  shifts  can  transform  an 
imitator  into  a fashion  dictator.  Section  III  examines  the  effect  of 
prior  disclosure  of  public  information  and  shows  that cascades  are 
fragile when  new public information  can arrive. Section  IV discusses 
several examples.  Section  V shows  how  the  possibility of  changes  in 
the underlying  value of  alternative  decisions  can lead to "fads," that 
is, to drastic and seemingly  whimsical swings in mass behavior without 
obvious  external  stimulus.  Section  VI concludes  the paper. 
7Becker  (1991)  examines  pricing  decisions  under  demand  externalities  that might 
arise from  informational  sources. 
8 In Scharfstein  and  Stein  (1990)  and  Zwiebel (1990),  conformity  is an agency  phe- 
nomenon.  Scharfstein  and  Stein  show  that  a  manager  may  imitate  the  action  of  a 
preceding  manager  in order  to improve  his reputation  for high ability. Zwiebel shows 
that relative performance  evaluation  may cause managers  to adhere  to inferior  indus- 
try standards.  Bhattacharya,  Chatterjee,  and Samuelson  (1986)  provide  an interactive 
learning  model  of  research  and development. 996  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
II.  The Basic Model 
Information  transmission  among  individuals  can  take  many  forms. 
For example,  individuals  may observe  all other  individuals'  informa- 
tion, only the signals of predecessors,  or only the actions of predeces- 
sors. Our analysis concentrates  on the least informative  case in which 
individuals  observe only the actions of previous  individuals.  Since "ac- 
tions speak louder  than words," the information  conveyed  by actions 
may also be the most credible. 
A.  A Specific  Model 
For expositional  clarity, we begin  with a specific model.  Assume  that 
there is a sequence  of individuals,  each deciding  whether  to adopt or 
reject some  behavior.  Each  individual  observes  the  decisions  of  all 
those ahead  of him.  The  ordering  of individuals  is exogenous  and is 
known to all.9 All individuals  have the same cost of adopting,  C, which 
for now we set to 1/2.  The  gain to adopting,  V, is also the same for all 
individuals  and is'either zero or one, with equal prior probability  1/2.10 
Individuals  differ  in  their  positions  in  the  queue.  Each  individual 
privately  observes  a  conditionally  independent  signal  about  value. 
Individual  i's signal Xi is either H or L, and H is observed  with proba- 
bility pi >  1/2 if the true value is one  and with probability  1 -  pi if the 
true value  is zero.  Table  1 describes  this binary  signal case. 
We examine  the special case of identically distributed  signals (pi  - 
p for  all i).  The  expected  value  of  adoption  is just  E[V]  =  y*  1  + 
(1  -  y)  0  0  =  y, where  y is the  posterior  probability  that  the  true 
value is one.  As a tie-breaking  convention,  an individual  indifferent 
between  adoption  and  rejection  adopts  or rejects with equal  proba- 
bility. 
Thus  the first individual  adopts  if his signal is H and rejects if it is 
L. The  second  individual  can infer  the  first individual's  signal  from 
his  decision.  If  the  first  individual  adopted,  the  second  individual 
adopts  if his signal  is also H.  However,  if his signal  is L, the  second 
individual computes  the expected  value of adoption  (given one H and 
one L signal) to be 1/2.  Being  indifferent,  he adopts with probability  1/2. 
Similarly,  if  the  first individual  had  rejected,  the  second  individual 
rejects if his signal  is also L and  accepts with probability  1/2 if his sig- 
nal is H.  The  third  individual  is faced  with  one  of  three  situations: 
(1) both  predecessors  have  adopted  (in which  case even  an L signal 
induces  him to adopt  and  thus creates  an up cascade),  (2) both  have 
9 In Sec.  IIC, we briefly discuss  the  determination  of the order  of  moves. 
10  The  model  also applies  to the choice  between  two arbitrary actions,  where  V and 
C are the differences  in values  and  in costs. INFORMATIONAL CASCADES  997 
TABLE  1 
SIGNAL  PROBABILITIES 
Pr(Xi =  HI  V)  Pr(Xi  =  LIV) 
v=  I  Pi  1-  Pi 
V =  ?  1  -  Pi  Pi 
rejected  (in which  case  even  an H  signal  induces  him  to  reject and 
thus creates  a DOWN cascade),  or  (3) one  has adopted  and  the  other 
rejected.  In the last case, the third individual  is in the same situation 
as the first individual:  his expected  value of adoption,  based only on 
his  predecessors'  actions,  is  1/2,  and  therefore  his  signal  determines 
his choice.  Should  this come  about, then a similar analysis shows that 
the  fourth  individual  would  be  in  the  same  situation  as the  second 
individual,  the fifth as the third,  and so forth. 
With  this  decision  rule,  we  can  derive  the  unconditional  ex  ante 
probabilities  of  an  up cascade,  no  cascade,  or a DOWN cascade  after 
two individuals, 
_p+  _  2  1-  p  +  p2 
2  ' 
- 
p2  2 
and 
1  (p  p  2)2/2  /2  1  -  (p  - p2)n/2 
2  '  p)l,2 
after an even  number  of individuals  n.11 Equation  (1) shows that the 
closer p is to 1/2,  the later a cascade is likely to start. A reduction  in p 
toward  1/2  is equivalent  to  adding  noise  to the  signal;  at p  =  1/2,  the 
signal is uninformative.  In other  words, cascades tend to start sooner 
when individuals  have more precise signals of the value of adoption.'2 
Moreover,  according  to (1), the probability of not being  in a cascade 
falls exponentially  with  the  number  of  individuals.  Even  for  a very 
" After  two individuals,  no  cascade  occurs  if there  is one  H  and one  L. This  value 
can be calculated  assuming  V =  1 (or 0). The  occurrence  of either HL or LH involves 
a coin  flip,  so  the  total  probability  is  1/2p(1  -  p)  +  1/2p(1  -  p)  =  p(1  -  p).  For the 
other  two values,  it suffices to note that since these  probabilities are not conditional  on 
V, Pr(up)  =  Pr(DOWN)  =  1/2[1  -  Pr(no  cascade)].  For the  expressions  in eq. (1), note 
that the  probability of  an up cascade  after  four  individuals  is the probability of  an up 
cascade  after  two individuals  plus  the  probability of  not being  in a cascade  after  two 
individuals multiplied  by the probability of an up cascade after another two individuals. 
In contrast,  the  probability  of  not being  in a cascade  after  four  individuals  is simply 
the probability of not being  in a cascade after two individuals  multiplied  by the proba- 
bility of  not being  in a cascade  after  another  two individuals. 
12  Specifically,  higher-precision  p raises  the  probability  of  histories  that lead  to the 
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noisy signal, as when p =  V/2  +  E, with E arbitrarily small, this probabil- 
ity after only  10 individuals  is less than 0.1  percent! 
We  can  also  derive  the  probability  of  ending  up  in  the  correct 
cascade.  The  probabilities  of  an up cascade,  no  cascade,  or  a DOWN 
cascade after  two individuals,  given that the true value is one, are 
P(P  +  1)  pO _  (p-2)(p-  1)  (2) 
2  2 
and after an even number of individuals n are 
p(p  +  1)[1  -  (p 
-  p2)n/2]n/2 
2(1 - p +p2) 
(p -  2)(P -  1)[1  -  (p  -p2)n/2]  (3) 
2(1-  p  +  p2) 
The  first expression  is the  probability  of  the  correct  cascade.  It can 
be shown that this probability is increasing  in p (see fig. 1) and n. Even 
for very informative  signals (where p is far from 1/2),  the probability of 
the wrong  cascade is remarkably high. 
The  problem  with cascades is that they prevent  the aggregation  of 
information  of  numerous  individuals.  Ideally,  if the  information  of 
many previous individuals  is aggregated,  later individuals should con- 
verge  to  the  correct  action.  However,  once  a  cascade  has  started, 
Prob 
1.0 G 
0.2  Incorrect  Cascade 
0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0 
Signal  Accuracy  (p) 
FIG. 1.-Probability  of a correct and an incorrect cascade as a function  of p (p is the 
probability that the  signal is high  [H] given  that the true value is high  [eq. (1)]). Even 
for large p, the  probability of  ending  up in the wrong  cascade is considerable. INFORMATIONAL  CASCADES  999 
actions convey  no information  about private signals; thus an individ- 
ual's action does  not improve  later decisions. 
Rogers  and  Shoemaker  (1971)  summarize  research  on  the  ability 
of outsiders  (or "change agents") to bring about the adoption  of desir- 
able innovations  within communities.  They  offer  the general  proposi- 
tion  that "change  agent  success  is positively  related  to his efforts  in 
increasing  his clients' ability to evaluate  innovations"  (p. 247).  This  is 
consistent with the prediction  of this binary example  that as the preci- 
sion  of  the  signal,  p,  increases,  a correct  cascade  starts with  higher 
probability and,  on average,  earlier. 
It is instructive  to  compare  the  outcome  in  the  previous-actions- 
observable  (PAO)  regime  to that of  the  more  informative  previous- 
signals-observable  (PSO) regime.  In the binary signal case, PAO leads 
to a more  uniform  outcome.  Following  any given  sequence  of signal 
realizations, the two regimes  lead to precisely identical outcomes,  un- 
til a cascade begins  in the PAO regime.  However,  in the PAO regime, 
after a cascade starts it is never  reversed.  In the PSO regime,  even  if 
an individual  does  not  follow  his private signal,  it joins  the common 
pool of  knowledge.  Hence,  a long  enough  series of opposing  signals 
will eventually  cause people's  behavior  to switch. Thus  the PAO leads 
to greater uniformity.  We shall argue in Section V that this uniformity 
is brittle:  small  shocks  can  easily  shift  the  behavior  of  many  indi- 
viduals. 
B.  A General  Model 
We now show that under  mild assumptions  on the signals and values, 
cascades will always arise. Let there be a sequence  of  individuals  i  = 
1, 2,  ..  .,  n, . ..  , each  deciding  whether  to adopt some  behavior  or 
to reject  it. Each individual  observes  the  decisions  of  all those  ahead 
of  him.  The  order  of  individuals  is  exogenous  and  is  known  to 
all. All  individuals  have  the  same  cost  of  adopting,  C, and  gain  to 
adopting,  V. The  gain  V has  a finite  set  of  possible  values,  vl  < v2 
<  . . . <  vs,  and  the  decision  is not  trivial (vl <  C <  vs).  The  prior 
probability that V =  v1  is denoted  [ul. 
We use the concept  of perfect  Bayesian equilibrium.  Since an indi- 
vidual's payoffs  do not depend  on  what later individuals  do,  there  is 
no incentive  to make  an out-of-equilibrium  move  to try to influence 
a later player. Thus,  without  loss of generality,  we assume  that if any 
player is observed  to deviate from the equilibrium,  either by rejecting 
when he should have adopted  regardless of his signal realization or by 
adopting  when  he  should  have  rejected  regardless,  then  subsequent 
individuals have the same beliefs  as though  he had chosen  his correct 
(equilibrium)  action. 1000  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Individuals  differ  not  only  by their  positions  in the  queue  but by 
the signals  they  privately  observe.  Each individual  i observes  one  of 
a conditionally  independent  and  identically  distributed  sequence  of 
signals Xi with possible  values x1 <  X2  <  X3  <  .  .  .  <  XR.  Let PqI  be the 
probability  that  an  individual  observes  signal  value  xq given  a  true 
value of adoption  of v1.  We assume  that Pql  >  0 for all q and 1. Let P 
be the cumulative  distribution  of Xi given  V =  vl, that is, 
q 
PVIqPr(Xi  XqIV=V  i)=VPil. 
j=1 
LetJi  be the set of  signal  realizations  that lead individual  i to adopt. 
His decision  communicates  to others  that he observed  either  a signal 
in  the  setJi  or  its complement.  If Ji  =  {X1,  X2, .  ..  ,  XR}  or  if Ji is 
empty,  then  individual  i's action  conveys  no  information  about  his 
realization. 
DEFINITION.  An informational  cascade occurs if an individual's  ac- 
tion does  not depend  on his private information  signal. 
If an individual i is in a cascade, then his action conveys no informa- 
tion and individual  i  +  1 draws the same inference  from all previous 
actions. Since  the signal Xi+,1  is drawn  from  the same distribution  as 
Xi, individual i +  1 is also in a cascade. Thus,  by induction,  all individ- 
uals after i are in a cascade. Consequently,  a cascade once started will 
last forever,  even  if it is wrong.  We shall see later that this fallibility 
causes cascades to be fragile.  For instance,  if individuals' signals have 
different  distributions,  as in Section  IIC,  if public information  is re- 
vealed  at a later date,  as in Section  IIIA,  or if underlying  values can 
change,  as in Section  V, then  cascades can easily be broken. 
Let ai be individual  i's action (adopt  or reject)  and let Ai =  (a,, a2, ... 
ai) represent  the  history  of  actions  taken by individuals  1, 2,  . . .,  i. 
Given history Ai- 1, letJi(Ai-  1, ai) be the set of signal realizations  that 
lead individual  i to choose  action ai. Then  individual  n  +  l's  condi- 
tional  expectation  of  V given  his  own  signal  realization  xq and  the 
history An is 
V.+ I (xq;  An)  E[VIXn+  I =  Xq,  Xi E Ji(Ai  -1, ai), for all i -  n]. 
Individual  n  +  1 adopts  if 13 Vn+I(xq; An) 2  C. Therefore,  the infer- 
ence  drawn  from  n  +  1's action  an + I is that Xn+1  EJ n  +  1 (A n, an  +  1)E 
where 
Jn+  1  (An, adopt)  =  {Xq  such that Vn+  1  (Xq;  An) 2  C}, 
Jn+  I  (An, reject)  =  {Xq  such that Vn+  I  (Xq;  An) <  C}. 
13 Since  we  are  no  longer  restricting  ourselves  to  a symmetric  example,  we  use  a 
tie-breaking assumption  (indifferent  individuals  adopt)  slightly different  from the one 
in the previous  section  (indifferent  individuals  randomize).  This  reduces  notation  but 
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We impose  two  regularity  conditions.  The  first is that the  condi- 
tional distributions  Pr(Xi I  V =  v1)  are ordered  by the monotone  likeli- 
hood  ratio property.'4  This  ensures  that if an individual  observes  a 
higher signal realization, he infers that the value of adoption  is higher 
(in a first-order  stochastic  dominance  sense). 
ASSUMPTION  1. Monotone  likelihood  ratio ordering.  -For  all 1 <  S, 
Pq,l :Pq,i+  I  for all q < R, 
Pq+  l,l  Pq+  1,1+1 
with strict inequality  for at least one  q. 
Assumption  1 ensures  that the conditional  expectation  of each indi- 
vidual increases  in his signal realization.  Thus  if individual  i is not in 
a cascade  and  he  adopts,  later individuals  conclude  that Xi >  Xq for 
some q. If i does  not  adopt,  then  the conclusion  is that Xi <  xq 
The  second  assumption  ensures  that  if  individuals  learn  enough 
about value by observing  predecessors,  then  they are not indifferent 
between  adopting  and  rejecting.'5 
ASSUMPTION  2. No  long-run  ties.-v1 #A C for all 1. 
A major  result  of  this  section  is that a cascade  eventually  begins. 
Suppose  that an individual  late in the sequence  is still making a deci- 
sion  based  on  his  own  information.  Then  the  decisions  of  earlier 
individuals  convey  some  information  about their signals. If this indi- 
vidual is far enough  down  the  line,  then,  by the strong  law of  large 
numbers,  with  probability  close  to  one  he  can  infer  the  true  value 
of  adoption  with  almost  perfect  certainty.  But  then  his  own  signal 
contributes  arbitrarily  little  to  his  information  set,  and  he  acts  ac- 
cording  to the information  conveyed  by the actions of previous  indi- 
viduals.  Therefore,  he  ignores  his  private  information  and  starts a 
cascade. 
PROPOSITION  1. If assumptions  1 and 2 hold,  then as the number of 
individuals  increases,  the  probability  that a cascade  eventually  starts 
approaches  one. 
While we have shown that cascades must eventually  occur, perhaps 
the  more  interesting  point  is that  they  will often  be wrong.'6  In an 
14 The  monotone  likelihood  ratio  property  is a standard  assumption  in  models  in 
which inferences  must be drawn from a noisy signal. Milgrom (1981) provides a presen- 
tation and applications. 
15 It is a mild  assumption.  If  VI,  v2 .  Vs and  C are drawn  randomly  from  any 
nonatomic  probability  measure,  assumption  2  is satisfied  with  probability  one.  This 
assumption  prevents  asymptotic  indifference  but is not a tie-breaking  convention. 
16  proof  of proposition  1 is based on the idea that many observations  of informa- 
tive actions  would  lead  with  high  probability  to  nearly  perfect  knowledge  of  value. 
Thus  with  high  probability  a cascade  must  start at or  before  such  a point,  but  this 
cascade will often  be an incorrect  one  that started  much  earlier.  As fig.  1 in Sec.  IIA 
shows,  the  probability  of  an incorrect  cascade  in the  specific  model  can be close  to .5 
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example  with binary  signals  and  a uniform  prior  on  the  true  value, 
Welch  (1992)  has  shown  that  cascades  will  start  and  can  often  be 
wrong.  Banerjee  (in press)  reaches  the  same  conclusion  assuming  a 
continuous  uniform  prior distribution  on the correct action; however, 
incorrect  cascades  in  his  setting  derive  from  a  degenerate  payoff 
function.  17 
C.  Fashion Leaders 
We now consider  a scenario in which individuals have different  signal 
precisions  (accuracy). In particular, consider  the binary signal case of 
table  1, where  higher  precision  of  individual  i's  signal  refers  to  a 
higher  value  of pi. We assume  that Pr(V  =  1) =  Pr(V  =  0)  =  1/2. 
RESULT  1. Suppose  that the  binary signal case obtains.  (1) If C  - 
1/2 and  if the  individual  with the highest  precision  decides  first, then 
the  first  individual's  decision  is  followed  by  all  later  individuals. 
(2)  Assume  that  all  individuals  n  >  1 observe  signals  of  identical 
precision.  Then  all individuals  n >  2 are better off if the first individ- 
ual's precision  is slightly lower rather than slightly higher  than theirs. 
Proof. (1) The  second  individual  infers  the first individual's  signal 
and so ignores  his own information,  starting a cascade. (2) If the first 
individual's  precision  is slightly  higher,  the second  individual  defers 
to  the  first  individual;  if  it  is  slightly  lower,  the  second  individual 
makes his own decision.  Thus  the latter case leads to more  informa- 
tion for later individuals.  Q.E.D. 
Result  1 illustrates  that small differences  in precision  can be very 
important  and  can  lead  to  cascades  that  are  even  less  informative 
(and,  so,  potentially  even  more  fragile)  than  when  individuals  have 
identically distributed  signals. While order is exogenous  in the model, 
it is plausible that the highest-precision  individual  decides  first. Con- 
sider a more  general  setting  in which  all individuals  have  the choice 
to  decide  or  to  delay,  but  there  is a  cost  of  delaying  decision.  All 
individuals  have  an  incentive  to  wait in  the  hope  of  free-riding  on 
the first to decide.  However,  other  things  equal,  the cost of deciding 
early is lowest for the individual  with the highest  precision. 
The  fashion  leader  model  applies  to situations  in which  a veteran 
performs  a task with novices.  If an experienced  individual  acts first, 
others frequently  imitate. The  prediction  that a low-precision  individ- 
ual imitates a higher-precision  predecessor  is consistent  with the evi- 
dence  of  numerous  psychological  experiments  demonstrating  that a 
subject's previous failure in a task raises the probability that in further 
17 As Lee (1991)  shows, with a continuum  of actions, behavior  generically  converges 
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trials he  will imitate  a model  performing  the  task (see Thelen,  Dol- 
linger,  and  Kirkland  1979,  p.  146). Deutsch  and  Gerard  (1955)  also 
give experimental  evidence  that the  more  uncertain  an individual  is 
about  the  correctness  of  his judgment,  the  more  susceptible  he  is 
to informational  influences  on  his decisions.  Being  better  informed, 
teachers and parents are natural opinion  leaders  (see Ainlay, Becker, 
and Coleman  1986). Rogers  (1983) summarizes  studies that show that 
community  leaders  have  superior  information."8  Similarly,  Stamps 
(1988,  p.  340)  summarizes  evidence  that among  territorial  animals, 
"individuals acquiring  their first territory in an unfamiliar habitat are 
more  apt  to  prefer  territories  next  to  previous  settlers  than  would 
territory owners  or floaters  that had lived in the habitat in the past." 
Result  1 illustrates  that a very slight  perturbation  in the  informa- 
tional setting  may make a very large difference  (between  an immedi- 
ate  or  later  cascade).  Thus  to  understand  the  "cause" of  a  social 
change,  it is crucial to pay careful  attention  to the early leaders.  In- 
deed,  when  mass behavior  arises idiosyncratically  from  chance  early 
events,  it can be futile  to seek grand  causal forces. 
Result  1 also suggests  that an individual  who wishes to bring about 
a social change,  for  example,  introduce  a desirable  innovation  such 
as an improved  sanitary method  in a peasant community,  must focus 
his efforts  on  persuading  early community  leaders.  Assume,  for  ex- 
ample,  that individuals  are ordered  by precisions.  Suppose  that the 
"change agent" can persuade  by causing  one  individual's  signal real- 
ization  to be  (correctly)  high,  that is, perfect  information  precision. 
Suppose,  however,  that others  are not aware of  the improved  preci- 
sion of the persuaded  individual.  Then  the change agent should focus 
his efforts  on  the first and best-informed  individual.  Studies by Bliss 
(1952,  p.  30)  and  Alers-Montalvo  (1957,  p.  6)  find  that individuals 
attempting  to  bring  about  social  change  are  more  successful  when 
they  work  through  community  leaders  (who  tend  to  be  better  in- 
formed). 19 
Although  we have suggested  that higher-precision  individuals  tend 
to  decide  earlier,  it  is  worth  considering  what  occurs  if  a  higher- 
18 Rogers and van Es (1964)  provide  evidence  that community  leaders in Colombian 
peasant communities  have more formal education,  higher literacy, larger farms, higher 
social status, more exposure  to mass media,  and more political knowledge  than follow- 
ers (see also Rogers  and Shoemaker  1971). Some  social psychologists  have recognized 
that imitation may be based on a belief that high-prestige  individuals are good  decision 
makers. Bandura  (1977,  p. 89) states that "in situations  in which people  are uncertain 
about the wisdom of modeled  courses of action, they must rely on such cues as general 
appearances,  speech,  style, age,  symbols of socioeconomic  success, and signs of exper- 
tise as indicators  of  past successes." 
19 Our  prediction  that  the  first individual  is entirely decisive  is often  unrealistic.  A 
milder result, that the first individual  is disproportionately  influential,  could be derived 
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precision  individual  is later in the  sequence.  Such an individual  can 
shatter a cascade because  he is more inclined  to use his own informa- 
tion than those  that precede  him. This  possibility of cascade reversal 
tends  to improve  decisions  because  more  information  can be aggre- 
gated than if only a single cascade occurred.  Thus  from a social point 
of  view, it may be desirable  to order  decision  makers  inversely  with 
their precisions.  It is not easy, however,  to think of how such a regime 
would  arise spontaneously. 
III.  Are Cascades  Fragile? 
We have  argued  that  the  actions  of  early  individuals  can  influence 
the behavior of others so that later individuals ignore their own infor- 
mation  and  merely  follow  suit.  The  uniformity  that cascades  cause 
can  be  similar  to  and  coexist  with  that  brought  about  by the  other 
forces  discussed  in the  Introduction  (sanctions,  payoff  externalities, 
and  conformity  preference).  However,  while  the  uniformity  stem- 
ming  from  these  other  factors  becomes  more  robust  as the  number 
of  adopters  increases,  the  "depth" of  an informational  cascade  need 
not  rise  with  the  number  of  adopters;  once  a cascade  has  started, 
further  adoptions  are uninformative.  Thus  conformity  is brittle. The 
arrival of a little information  or the mere possibility of a value change 
(even  if the  change  does  not  actually occur)  can shatter an informa- 
tional cascade. 
A.  The Public Release of Information 
Cascades can be sensitive to public information  releases. For example, 
behavior may reverse  when  government  and research institutions  re- 
lease new  information  on  the  hazards  of  smoking  and the effects  of 
medical  procedures  (e.g.,  tonsillectomy),  drugs  (e.g.,  aspirin),  and 
diet  (e.g.,  oat  bran).  We  address  three  questions  in  this  subsection: 
(1) Does  the  single  release  of  information  make all subsequent  indi- 
viduals better off?  For example,  are all potential  aspirin users better 
off  if  all  are  provided  with  more  information  about  its  effects  on 
heart disease? (2) Can a cascade be reversed,  and how difficult is this? 
For example,  should  the government  release information  to dissuade 
potential smokers from imitating the millions of addicted  individuals? 
(3) Does the multiple  release of information  eventually  make individ- 
uals better  off?  For example,  if medical  science  gradually  generates 
information  about the adverse consequences  of tonsillectomy  without 
special  medical  indications,  will  all  doctors  eventually  reject  this 
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1.  The  Effect  of an Initial Public Disclosure 
Result 2 addresses  the  first question. 
RESULT  2. The  release  of  public  information  before  the  first indi- 
vidual's decision  can make some  individuals  worse off  (in an ex  ante 
sense). 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The  public  information  release  has  two  effects  on  an  individual: 
(1) it directly provides  more information,  and (2) it changes  the deci- 
sions  of  predecessors  and,  thus,  the  information  conveyed  by their 
decisions.  Result 2 is based  on an example  in which the public infor- 
mation  is very noisy,  but it reduces  the information  conveyed  to the 
second  individual  by  the  first  individual's  decision  so  much  that  it 
outweighs  the direct  positive  effect. 
Thus  it  is  by  no  means  clear  whether  public  health  authorities 
should  act quickly to  disseminate  noisy  information.  Sketchy  disclo- 
sures of advantages  of  oat bran and  fish oil, by triggering  fads,  may 
do more harm than good.20 On the other  hand,  a highly  informative 
disclosure,  such  as the  release  of  compelling  evidence  on  the  health 
effects  of  smoking,  is likely to benefit  everyone. 
2.  The  Depth  of  a Cascade 
The  ambiguity  of  the  effect  of  a  public  disclosure  ceases  when  a 
cascade starts. 
PROPOSITION  2. If all individuals'  signals are drawn from  the same 
distribution,  then  after  a cascade  has begun,  all individuals  welcome 
public information. 
Proof. After  a cascade  has begun,  if there  is no  public  disclosure, 
individuals'  decisions  convey  no  further  information.  Thus  public 
disclosure  conveys  information  directly  without  reducing  the  infor- 
mation  conveyed  by individuals'  decisions.  Q.E.D. 
Result  3  suggests  that  cascades  are  delicate  with  respect  to  new 
information. 
RESULT 3. The  release of a small amount  of public information  can 
shatter  a  long-lasting  cascade,  where  a  "small amount"  refers  to  a 
signal less informative  than  the private signal of  a single  individual. 
Proof. Consider  the binary signal  example  of  the  previous  section. 
An  uP (DOWN)  cascade  ensues  as soon  as an individual  observes  two 
20 Early medical  reports  indicated  that oat bran lowers cholesterol  levels, which sud- 
denly  increased  the  popularity  of  oat  bran  products;  a new  study  contradicted  this 
result, killing the fad.  However,  a subsequent  study suggested  that oat brap. is moder- 
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more adopt (reject) than reject (adopt) decisions.  All subsequent  indi- 
viduals understand  that either both individuals  received H (L) signals 
or only  the  first individual  observed  an H  (L) signal  and  the  second 
flipped a coin. Consider  a public signal that is slightly less informative 
than  a private  signal.  Even  if  the  cascade  was due  to  two H's,  one 
public L signal suffices  to induce  an individual  to consider  his infor- 
mation, since with one  more L signal he is indifferent  between  adopt- 
ing and rejecting.  Since there is a positive probability that the cascade 
was caused by only one H (L) signal, the individual  with public infor- 
mation  thus  acts according  to his own information  and adopts  on H 
and rejects on L. Q.E.D. 
Intuitively,  cascades  aggregate  the information  of only a few early 
individuals' actions. The  public information  thus needs  only to offset 
the information  conveyed  by the  action of  the last individual  before 
the start of the cascade,  even  if millions  subsequently  imitated.  Thus 
the  fact that a vast segment  of  society  already  smokes  need  not  dis- 
courage  investigation  of  the effects  of  smoking. 
A possible illustration  of fragility is the adoption  of hybrid corn by 
Iowa farmers from  1928 to  1941. Ryan and Gross (1943) interviewed 
Iowa farmers and found  that the average  time between  first learning 
of  hybrid corn  and  adopting  was 9 years. Thus,  for most of  the  pe- 
riod, respondents  were aware of but did not adopt hybrid corn (DOWN 
cascade). It seems likely that the later widespread  adoption  of hybrid 
corn (up cascade) was due to the arrival of further  information  about 
its effectiveness.2' 
3.  The  Effect  of  Multiple  Public 
Information  Disclosures 
Since a cascade can be shattered  by even  a minor  public information 
release, a relevant question  is whether,  asymptotically (as the number 
of disclosures  becomes  large),  society is certain to settle into the cor- 
rect cascade.22 
21 Ryan and Gross also found  that neighbors'  adoption  was the most frequent  reason 
for  adoption,  consistent  with  a  cascade  scenario.  Similarly,  Deutschmann  and  Fals 
Borda's  (1962)  study  of  Colombian  peasant  communities  also  suggests  that cascades 
may be important  for adoption  of innovations.  They  found  that villagers seldom  tried 
farming  innovations  on  a  partial  basis  and  that  about  80  percent  of  respondents 
adopted  fully  after  observing  the  use  of  the  innovation  on  a neighbor's  farm.  It may 
be  plausibly  argued  that  in this  setting  individuals  observe  only  their  neighbors  and 
not the  entire  history.  However,  in the  specific model  of  Sec. IIA, even  if individuals 
have imperfect  recall in that they observe  only the most recent  predecessors,  cascades 
can occur and will be fragile. 
22 We follow  the tie-breaking  assumption  of Sec. IIB that when  indifferent  the indi- 
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PROPOSITION  3.  If  there  is a  probability,  bounded  from  zero,  of 
further  public  information  release  before  each  individual  chooses 
(and the public information  is conditionally  independent  and identi- 
cally distributed and assumptions  1 and 2 are satisfied), then individu- 
als eventually  settle into the correct cascade. 
The  proof  is a standard  application  of  the  law of  large  numbers 
and  is  omitted.  It  relies  on  the  fact  that  as  the  number  of  public 
information  releases  increases,  the  correct  choice  becomes  clearer. 
The  strong law of large numbers  ensures  that as long as public infor- 
mation  is conditionally  independent  and  identically  distributed,  the 
posterior  concentrates  on  the  true value  and  each  individual  almost 
surely decides  correctly.  Thus  each  individual  acts like the  previous 
individual,  and the correct  cascade results. 
Since proposition  3 relies on asymptotic arguments,  it provides only 
moderate  grounds  for  optimism.  Further  intuition  can  be  gained 
from  a  numerical  example.  Consider  again  the  binary-signal/value 
case  discussed  in  Section  IIA.  However,  we  now  introduce  a small 
probability  that  an  information  signal,  drawn  independently  from 
the same distribution  as each individual's  signal, is publicly released. 
Columns  1-2,  4-5,  and  7-8  in  table  2 list the  probabilities  that an 
up cascade  and  a DOWN  cascade  will be in process  when  the  1,000th 
individual  is reached  as a function  of p, the probability that the signal 
is H given that the actual value of V is one.  The  probability of settling 
into the correct up cascade increases dramatically even when only very 
few public releases  of information  occur on average.  For example,  if 
P =  .75, the probability of ending  up in the correct cascade increases 
from  .81  when  there  is  no  public  information  release  to  .86  (.98) 
when on average one  (10) release(s) of public information  occurs per 
1,000 individuals. 
As a possible  case  in which  an incorrect  cascade  started  and  then 
reverted  to the correct  cascade,  Apodaca  (1952)  documented  the in- 
troduction  of  one  variety  of  hybrid  seed  corn  for  84  growers  in  a 
New  Mexico  village  from  1945  to  1949  in  which  a trend  reversed 
before  settling  on  an  outcome.  Since  the  hybrid  seed  yielded  three 
times as much  as the old seed,  the percentage  of adopters  rose from 
0 percent  in  1945 to 60 percent  in 1947. However,  2 years later it fell 
back to  3  percent  when  the  villagers  decided  that  the  hybrid  corn 
tasted worse. 
Columns  3,  6,  and  9 record  the  expectation  of  the  difference  be- 
tween the number  of inferred  H and L signals after  1,000 individuals. 
With public information,  the  average  cascade is quite  deep  and cor- 
rectly positive.  If p  =  .65  (a rather  noisy  signal),  with  10 per  1,000 
public information  releases,, the expected  difference  is 4.6. O-  V 
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B.  Discussion 
The  social cost of  cascades  is that the  benefit  of  diverse  information 
sources is lost. Thus  a cascade regime  may be inferior  to a regime  in 
which  the  actions  of  the  first n individuals  are  observed  only  after 
stage  n  +  1. However,  the  fragility  of  cascades  allows  some  of  the 
benefit of information  diversity to be recaptured.  Incorrect decisions, 
once  taken,  can  be  rapidly  reversed.  For instance,  a high-precision 
individual  late  in  the  sequence  can  break  a cascade,  which  leads  to 
better  decisions.  Public  information  disclosures  can break  incorrect 
cascades and eventually  bring  about the correct decision. 
IV.  Examples 
We have  argued  that in  situations  in which  individuals  with  private 
information  make  sequential  decisions,  cascades  may  be  pervasive. 
This  section  discusses  some  illustrative  examples.  Even  though  in 
many  cases other  factors  (sanctions,  payoff  externalities,  or confor- 
mity  preference)  may  be  present  as well,  the  sequential  process  of 
decisions  under  uncertainty  can lead to cascades. 
We used  several criteria for selecting  examples.  The  first group  of 
criteria  pertains  to  model  assumptions:  (i)  actions  are  sequential, 
(ii) decision  makers  combine  their  private  information  signals  with 
those  of  previous  individuals,  (iii) decision  makers  act on  the  basis 
of  observation  of  actions  rather  than  verbal  communication,  and 
(iv) sanctions  and externalities  that might enforce  uniformity  are ab- 
sent. Assumption  i does  not require a perfect  linear ordering  of indi- 
viduals. As long  as there  is enough  sequentiality  in the model,  results 
of  a  similar  nature  would  apply.23 We  view  assumption  iii  as  less 
important  since  "actions speak  louder  than  words." With  regard  to 
assumption  iv, externalities  can oppose  uniformity,  strengthening  the 
inference  that  some  other  effect  (such  as informational  cascades)  is 
the cause  of  uniformity.  (However,  even  when  externalities  support 
uniformity,  cascades may still play a role in determining  which action 
will prevail.) 
The  second  group  of criteria pertains to model  implications:  (i) the 
phenomenon  is local or idiosyncratic  (in the sense  that actions  seem 
to have low correlation  with the underlying  desirability of the alterna- 
23 Similar results also apply when individuals  observe the actions of only a few imme- 
diate  predecessors  (see  n.  21)  and  when  individuals  observe  only  a summary  statistic 
for previous  actions  (e.g.,  aggregate  sales figures).  For example,  in the specific model 
of Sec. 11A, an individual  need  only observe  a public summary statistic, the difference 
between the number of adoptions  and rejections, which substitutes perfectly for knowl- 
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tives), (ii) the phenomenon  displays fragility, and (iii) some  individu- 
als ignore  their own  private information; 
A.  Politics 
In a study of U.S.  presidential  nomination  campaigns,  Bartels (1988, 
p.  110) discusses  "cue-taking," in which  an individual's  beliefs  about 
a candidate  are influenced  by the  decisions  of others:  "the operative 
logic is, roughly,  that '25,000  solid New Hampshirites  (probably) can't 
be  too  far wrong.'"  Several  studies  of  political  momentum  use  nu- 
merical survey measures  (called "thermometer  ratings") of how much 
respondents  like the candidate.  These  studies demonstrate  that, when 
one  controls  for  other  factors,  more  favorable  poll  results cause  re- 
spondents  to evaluate a candidate  more positively (Bartels 1988). This 
is consistent  with  informational  cascades.  Strategic  voting,  in which 
an  individual's  willingness  to  vote  for  a candidate  depends  on  his 
expectation  of the candidate's  prospects,  explains  why early successes 
of a candidate  may lead people  to vote for him, but does  not explain 
why his thermometer  ratings  should  increase. 
As a possible example,  in the  1976 presidential  campaign,  the little- 
known  candidate  Jimmy  Carter achieved  an important  early success 
by concentrating  his efforts  toward securing  the Democratic  nomina- 
tion  in  the  Iowa  caucus  (which  preceded  the  first primary  in  New 
Hampshire).  "Super Tuesday,"  in which many southern  states coordi- 
nated  their  primaries  on  the  same date, was an attempt  to avoid the 
consequences  of  sequential  voting.24 
B.  Zoology 
There  is evidence  of imitative behavior  transmission  among  animals, 
especially in territory choice,  mating,  and foraging.  According  to Ga- 
lef  (1976,  p.  78),  "intraspecific interaction  resulting  in the  transmis- 
sion of acquired  patterns  of behavior  from one  individual  to another 
within  a population  is a relatively  common  and  important  mode  of 
adaptation  in  both  primate  and  nonprimate  vertebrate  organisms." 
An advantage  of  zoological  examples  is that animals are less able to 
discuss  the  merits  of  alternative  actions  and  are  not  influenced  by 
"just say no" mass-media  campaigns.25 
24  In  McKelvey  and  Ordeshook's  (1985)  model,  opinion  polls  convey  information 
that causes bandwagons. 
25  Examples  of  behavioral  spread  through  imitation  of  one  individual  by  another 
include  potato  washing  by Japanese  macaques  (Kawai 1965)  and milk bottle  opening 
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Stamps (1988)  discusses  that, even  after one  controls  for site qual- 
ity, animals often  arrange  their  territories  in clusters.  Clustering  oc- 
curs despite  possible negative  externalities  of being close to a competi- 
tor  for  mates  and  food.  Persson's  (1971)  study  of  the  whitethroat 
(Sylvia communes)  found  that  clustering  results  because  newcomers 
prefer to locate near earlier settlers. Consistent  with our theory,  Kies- 
ter and Slatkin (1974)  argue that clustering can be explained  by males' 
use of  the  presence  of  other  males  as an indicator  of  high  resource 
quality  in  nearby  territories.  The  cascades  model  suggests  that  the 
somewhat  arbitrary choices of a few early settlers determine  the loca- 
tions  of  clusters.  Several  studies  indicate  that territorial  clumping  is 
idiosyncratic  and  is not  mainly  due  to  convergence  on  high-quality 
territories  (see Stamps  [1988]  and the  references  therein). 
In  "How  to  Find  the  Top  Male," Pomiankowski  (1990)  discusses 
recent evidence  that females  copy the mating choice of other  females 
in lek species.26 For example,  "in both  fallow deer  and  sage  grouse, 
the  rate  at which  females  enter  male  territories  correlates  with  the 
number  of females  already present" (p. 66).  In an experiment,  when 
a stuffed  female  grouse  was put  on  the  territory  of  an unattractive 
male, the  number  of  females  entering  the territory increased. 
Gibson,  Bradbury,  and  Vehrencamp  (1991)  establish  the  preva- 
lence  of  copying  among  sage  grouse  after  controlling  for  several 
other  factors  that could  affect  male  reproductive  success.  Following 
Wade and  Pruett-Jones  (1990),  they  point  out  that copying  explains 
why mate choice  is highly  unanimous  even  when  mate choice  corre- 
lates  poorly  with  observable  characteristics  of  males  or  their  sites. 
This  is consistent  with  the  arbitrariness  of  group  behavior  implied 
by cascades.  Copying  here  is particularly significant  in view of  some 
negative  externalities:  females  must often  wait long  periods  of  time, 
and sperm  may be depleted. 
C.  Medical Practice and Scientific Theory 
Taylor  (1979)  and  Robin  (1984)  discuss numerous  surgical fads and 
epidemics  of treatment-caused  illnesses  ("iatroepidemics"). Some  op- 
erations  that  have  come  and  gone  in  popularity  are  tonsillectomy, 
elective  hysterectomy,  internal  mammary  ligation,  and ileal bypass.27 
They  argue that the initial adoption  of these practices was frequently 
based on weak positive  information.  Robin also points  out  that most 
doctors are not well informed  about the cutting edge  of research; this 
26 In  lek species  such  as fallow  deer  and  sage  grouse,  females  visit aggregations  of 
males (the "lek") to select a mate. Some males mate with many females,  whereas others 
do not mate. 
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suggests  that when  in doubt,  they may imitate. Burnum  (1987)  refers 
to  "bandwagon  diseases"  popularized  by physicians  who,  "like lem- 
mings, episodically  and with a blind infectious  enthusiasm  [push] cer- 
tain diseases  and treatments  primarily because  everyone  else is doing 
the  same"  (p.  1222).  In  our  model,  one  adoption  may  be  enough 
to  start a cascade.  Therefore,  when  one  obtains  a second  opinion, 
withholding  the  first  opinion  from  the  second  doctor  may  be  ad- 
visable. 
We now compare  the adoption  of one surgical procedure,  tonsillec- 
tomy,  with  the  predictions  of  the  cascades  model.  As  Robin  (1984, 
p.  75)  points  out,  "For many  decades,  tonsillectomy  was performed 
in millions of children  on a more  or less routine  basis. In most cases, 
the operation  was unnecessary."  He also states that tonsils are needed 
for  defense  against  infections  and  that  some  children  were  injured 
and  died  during  the  procedure.  The  adoption  of  tonsillectomy  was 
not  associated  with  any  definitive  public  information,  such  as con- 
trolled  studies,  supporting  it  (see  Taylor  1979).  A  critical  English 
panel,  the  Schools'  Epidemic  Committee  of  the  Medical  Research 
Council,  claimed  that tonsillectomy  was being  "performed  as a rou- 
tine prophylactic  ritual for no particular reason and with no particu- 
lar result" (quoted in Taylor  [1979,  p. 159]). The  rate of tonsillectomy 
has declined  in recent  years. 
There  has also been  significant idiosyncratic geographical  variation 
in the frequency  of tonsillectomy  (Taylor  1979). In England  in  1938, 
the  frequency  in some  regions  was one-half  of  the  nation's average, 
and in others  it was three  times  as high.  The  only  factor that could 
be implicated  was variation  in  "medical opinion."  In  the  late  sixties 
to seventies,  tonsillectomy  was six times  more  frequent  in  New  En- 
gland  than in Sweden,  with England  and Australia in between. 
Adoption  of  a scientific  theory  can also cascade.  Very  few  people 
have  carefully  examined  the  evidence  that  the  earth  is round  (e.g., 
Foucault's pendulum  or anomalies  on  maps).  But since many others 
have adopted  the  view,  others  accept  it. Even  among  physicists,  few 
can examine  carefully  the evidence  on  all major theories.  Inevitably, 
individuals  must  accept  the  overall  decisions  of  others  rather  than 
their  arguments  and  evidence.  Thus  we  expect  the  adoption  of  a 
theory  to depend  on  the reputation  of its early exponents. 
D.  Finance 
In the market for corporate  control,  the arrival of a first takeover bid 
frequently  attracts competing  bids, despite  the fact that the presence 
of the first bidder  drives up the price. This  suggests  that the positive 
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outweighs  the negative  payoff  externality.  On a larger scale, financial 
and takeover  markets  have waves,  such as the conglomerate  merger 
wave of  the  1960s and its reversal through  restructuring  and hostile 
takeovers in the 1980s, that are hard to explain entirely by fundamen- 
tal factors. 
Another  possible application  is the decision of investors to subscribe 
to  an initial  public  offering.  Welch  (1992)  uses  a cascade  model  to 
show that if sufficiently  many (few) individuals sign up early to receive 
shares,  all (no)  subsequent  individuals  follow  their lead.  He  further 
considers  the  optimal  pricing  of  shares  to  induce  cascades  of  sub- 
scription. 
If one  creditor  refuses  to  renegotiate  debt  with a distressed  firm, 
others  may also. Similarly, the start of a bank run can be viewed  as a 
cascade in which small depositors  fear for the solvency of a bank and 
act by  observing  the  withdrawal  behavior  of  other  depositors  (see 
Diamond  and Dybvig  1983).28 
It has frequently  been  argued  that stock market price movements 
are caused  by waves  of  investor  sentiment.  Although  cascades  may 
apply to bubbles or crashes, this is not captured  directly by our model, 
since the cost of  adopting  (e.g.,  buying  a stock) increases  as a bubble 
forms (see Friedman  and Aohi  1991; Camerer and Weigelt, in press). 
E.  Peer Influence and Stigma 
"Peer pressure"  is often  invoked  as an explanation  for  conformity; 
the term connotes  coercion.  Our theory offers  an alternative explana- 
tion for the influence  of  peers:  that individuals,  especially  those with 
little  information  or  experience,  obtain  information  from  the  deci- 
sions  of  others.  For example,  in  the  important  Asch  (1952)  experi- 
ments on the comparison  of line lengths  by members  of groups,  con- 
formity can be interpreted  as information-based  rather than coercive 
(see Deutsch  and  Gerard  1955). 
Stigma is the  negative  typecasting  of  persons  that are outside  the 
norm  of  the  social unit.29 Evidence  described  in Ainlay  et al. (1986) 
suggests  that  stigma  is  local  (i.e.,  group-specific)  and  is learned  by 
observing  the  behavior  of  others  such  as parents  (see also Sigelman 
and Singleton  1986,  p.  188). An individual  may be stigmatized  when 
negative  information  conveyed  by  earlier  rejections  starts  a  DOWN 
cascade.  For example,  gaps in a job  seeker's resume  may reveal  that 
28 Clearly,  there  are  strong  payoff  externalities  in both  these  examples.  However, 
information  about either  fundamentals  or the likelihood  of a run may be conveyed  by 
the early decision  makers even  if the  first few decisions  create little externality. 
29 Akerlof  (1976)  provides  a model  of  stigma based on ostracism. 1014  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
potential  employers  chose  not to hire him. Similarly, individuals  who 
divorced  or severed  business  ties may carry a stigma. 
Conversely,  a job  applicant  who  receives  early job  offers  may be- 
come a "star." In the rookie  market for professors,  later schools  may 
give job  interviews  and offers  based on the known interest  of earlier 
schools.  Similarly,  to be  granted  tenure  at a university,  it is helpful 
to  receive  tenured  offers  elsewhere.30  Our  theory  suggests  that  an 
individual's  early-career  status as a star can be precarious.3' 
V.  Fads 
Fads and conventions  often  change  without  apparent  reason.  In our 
basic model,  cascades can cause individuals  to converge  on the wrong 
decision.  We now propose  that seemingly  whimsical shifts in behavior 
occur because an initial cascade may aggregate  very little information. 
If there  is a small probability  that the underlying  value changes  at a 
particular stage,  then  cascades  can switch, not just  because  the right 
action  has changed,  but because  people  are not  sure whether  it has 
changed.  The  possibility that value changes  can cause random  signal 
outcomes  to deceive,  so that sometimes  behavior  changes  even  when 
value does  not.  Thus  behavior  may change  frequently  even  if value 
seldom  changes. 
Although  we  analyze  an  example,  we  believe  that  similar  results 
would apply in more general  settings. Let the initial value of adoption 
be  V  =  0 or  1, both  equally  likely.  This  value  of  adoption  remains 
unchanged  until  i  =  100.  At  i  =  101,  with  probability  .1  the  true 
value  may be  redrawn  (again  with both  zero  and  one  being  equally 
likely). Let W denote  the true value after i  =  100. Thus  W =  V with 
probability  .95,  and  W  =  1  -  V with  probability  .05.  The  cost  of 
adoption  is C =  .5. 
Each  individual  i observes  a signal Xi  =  H  or L that is indepen- 
dently distributed  conditional  on the current  true value as in table 1, 
with  probability pi =  p. We  shall  show  that  a fad  can  change  even 
though  the  true  value  remains  unchanged  and  that  if p  =  .9,  the 
probability  of  a  change  in  behavior  is greater  than  the  probability 
that the value actually changes. 
We describe  three  alternative  regimes:  full  information,  previous 
signals observable,  and  previous  actions observable. 
3r Rosen  (1981)  provides  an  alternative  explanation  for  superstars  based  on  scale 
economies  that magnify  the effect  of  skill differences. 
31  Blanchard  and  Summers  (1988)  emphasize  that the  instability of  unemployment 
rates  implies  a  need  for  theories  of  fragile  equilibrium  in  labor  markets,  and  they 
discuss  models  based  on  downward-sloping  labor supply  curves  and  upward-sloping 
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A.  Full-Information  Regime and 
Previous-Signals-Observable  Regime 
Under  full  information,  all  individuals  can  observe  V and  always 
choose  the correct  action.  Thus  individuals  1-100  adopt  if and only 
if V =  1, and  individuals  101 and beyond  adopt  if and only if W  = 
1. At i  =  101, behavior  changes  with probability  .05. 
Under  the  previous-signals-observable  regime,  the  pattern  of  be- 
havior is similar. Since the aggregate  information  of individuals  rap- 
idly becomes  very  precise,  individuals  10 (say) through  100  choose 
the  correct  action  with very  high  probability. Just  before  individual 
101, a new value  may be drawn;  again by individual  110 the correct 
decision  is almost surely taken.  Hence,  the probability of a change  in 
behavior  is very close  to .05. 
B.  Previous Actions Observable:  The Cascade  Regime 
We now examine  the  probability of a change  in behavior  at i  =  101 
(i.e.,  the  probability  of  going  from  an up cascade before  i  =  101 to 
a DOWN  cascade soon after i =  101, or vice versa) when only previous 
actions  are  observable.32 Equation  (1)  implies  that  with  probability 
close to one, a cascade starts by period  100 and that an up and a DOWN 
cascade  are  equally  likely.  We  summarize  this  example  as  follows. 
RESULT  4.  In  the  numerical  example  on  fads  the  probability  of  a 
cascade reversal  is greater  than  .0935,  compared  to a probability of 
only  .05  that the  correct  choice  changes.  Therefore,  the  probability 
of convention  changes  can be substantially higher when only previous 
actions are observed  than under  full information. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The  probability of behavior  shifts can be much  higher  (87 percent 
higher  in this example)  than under  the full-information  and the pre- 
vious-signals-observable  regimes.  Intuitively,  and  in  contrast  with  a 
full-information  regime,  individuals  are  not  very confident  that  the 
original  cascade  was correct. 
This  is more  an example  of  fads  than of  fashions,  in that we still 
assume  a true underlying  value that is independent  of the actions of 
participants.  In  clothing  fashion,  for  example,  whether  "pink is in" 
or whether  a short skirt is acceptable this season depends  on who else 
decides  to adopt  the  fashion.33 However,  as discussed  in the conclu- 
32 As in Sec. IIA, we adopt  the tie-breaking  convention  that if an individual  is indif- 
ferent  between  adopting  and rejecting,  he  adopts  with probability  l/2. 
33 Karni and  Schmeidler  (1990)  and  Matsuyama  (1991)  provide  theories  of  fashion 
in  which  some  individuals  have  a taste  for  being  different  from  others.  In  Conlisk 
(1976),  individuals  have  a  preference  for  change  per  se.  In  Bulow  and  Klemperer 
(1991),  information  about  a buyer's  independent  valuation  can cause  "frenzies" and 
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sion,  we  believe  that  informational  cascades  are  also  important  in 
settings  in which  individuals  are trying to forecast  others' actions.34 
VI.  Concluding  Remarks 
Conformity often  appears spontaneously  without any obvious punish- 
ment  of  the deviators.  Informational  cascades can explain  how such 
social conventions  and norms  arise, are maintained,  and change.  We 
show  that  cascades  can  explain  not  only  conformity  but  the  rapid 
spread of new behaviors.  We argue  that conformist  behaviors  can be 
fragile and idiosyncratic because  cascades start readily on the basis of 
even  a small  amount  of  information.  There  are  many  models  that 
have unstable  equilibria for some  parameter  values; this leads to fra- 
gility only  when  players  happen  to balance  at a knife-edge.  In  our 
model,  fragility arises systematically  because  cascades bring about pre- 
carious equilibria.  It may be fruitful  to perform  experimental  tests of 
how cascades form  and shift in order  to gain insight into the process 
of social change. 
It should  be noted  that actual applications  usually involve mixtures 
of informational  effects,  sanctions  against deviants,  payoff  externali- 
ties, and  conformity  preference.  All these  are important  for  under- 
standing  social behavior.  Nevertheless,  even  behavior  that has been 
explained  by sanctions, payoff externalities,  or conformity  preference 
may often  be better understood  with an analysis that combines  these 
mechanisms  with informational  cascades. 
Some of these alternative theories  may permit the existence  of mul- 
tiple equilibria.  If everyone  expects  others  to switch to another  equi- 
librium, then  it pays people  to conform  to the change.  Therefore,  if 
people  are primed  for  change,  perhaps  by a central authority,  then 
the action can shift. For example,  consumers  may expect a new season 
to  introduce  new  clothing  fashions.  Similarly,  Kuran  (1989,  1991) 
points  out  that  once  people  believe  that  the  government  will  fall, 
individuals  become  more  willing  to voice  opposition  publicly.  Either 
of  these  scenarios  can be  combined  with cascade  effects.  Sequential 
observation  of decisions  of previous  individuals  can lead to a cascade 
on  a new  fashion  or a political  revolution.  Cascades can explain  the 
process  by which society switches  from  one  equilibrium  to another. 
A  generalization  of  our  model  is to allow  individuals  to  invest  in 
obtaining  information.  Similar results apply in this setting,  with indi- 
viduals  obtaining  information  only  until  a  cascade  starts  and  later 
individuals  imitating  the early ones. 
34 We conjecture  that other  types of  noise  or shocks,  such as imperfect  observation 
of actions or ignorance  of  preferences,  can also shift cascades and cause  fads. INFORMATIONAL  CASCADES  1017 
An  important  extension  of  the  model  would  allow  individuals  to 
have heterogeneous  but correlated  values of adoption.  In such a set- 
ting, since others' decisions  are less relevant,  cascades may begin later 
and be less likely to occur.  If the types of individuals are not common 
knowledge,  an  adoption  cascade  may  occur,  but  the  action  may be 
undesirable  for  those  who  have  a  lower  value  of  adoption.  These 
individuals  may still adopt  because  they  do not  know  perfectly  their 
predecessors'  personal  values of  adoption. 
Another  possible  extension  of  the  analysis would  examine  liaison 
individuals,  that  is,  individuals  who  link  two  or  more  cliques  (see 
Rogers  [1983]  for  a discussion).  For  example,  a cascade  in  France 
may go in the opposite  direction  from  a cascade in Great Britain.  If 
one  individual  can observe  both cascades and if only his decision  can 
be  observed  in  both  countries,  then  he  may  break  one  of  the  two 
cascades. As the world becomes  more of a global village, our analysis 
predicts  that  such  linkage  can  reverse  local cascades.  U.S.  "cultural 
imperialism"  (in  television,  cinema,  fast  food,  sneakers,  and  blue 
jeans)  may be  a case  in  point.  Socially,  it may be  desirable  to  have 
separate groups  that are only later combined,  so that later individuals 
can aggregate  the information  of several cascades instead of just one. 
Appendix 
The proof of proposition 1 requires the following strong law of large num- 
bers (see DeGroot 1970, p. 203). 
STRONG  LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS.  Let ZI, Z2,...  be a sequence of indepen- 
dent and identically distributed random variables  with mean X. Then, with 
probability  one, 
n 
lim  -  ,Zj. 
Proof  of Proposition  1 
We now prove that, for all E>  0, there exists an integer N(E) such that with 
probability  1 -  E a cascade starts  at or before period N(E). 
The monotone likelihood ratio property  implies that the conditional  distri- 
butions of the signals are ordered by strict first-order  stochastic  dominance, 
that is, 
Pq1 >  Pq2 >  *  > PqS  for all q < R.  (Al) 
Further,  assumption 1 implies that, for all An,  Vn  I1 (xq; An) is increasing  in q. 
To simplify the notation, throughout the rest of the proof we assume that 
R =  3. The proof for R > 3 is very similar.  The proof for R =  2 is a special 
case of a result in DeGroot (1970, pp. 202-4). 
Suppose that a cascade  has not started  till period n +  1. It is easily verified 
that each of the preceding individuals made use of their private signal, and 1i18  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
their actions indicate whether their private signal was greater than or less 
than a cutoff value. Let the history of actions be A,. Then for each i, either 
J (Ai-1, adopt)  E  {x2,  x3} orJ (Ai-1,  adopt)  E {X3}. For each 1 =  1, 2, .  , 
let Zql  q =  1, 2, be binomial random variables  with distribution  prob{Zql  = 
0} = P  and prob{Zqi  =  1} =  1 -  Pqi. Thus if the true value of V is vl*,  then 
the infmation  revealed to individual n  +  1 by his predecessors'  actions 
consists of nq  (q =  1, 2) realizations  of Zql*,  where nq  >  0,  n1 +  n2  =  n. The 
realizations of Zql*  are indexed  Zql*(j), where j  =  1, ..  .,  nq. These  n realiza- 
tions are independent.  Of course,  individual  n  +  1 does  not know the  true 
value and  therefore  does  not  know  whether  he  has observed  nq  realizations 
of  Zqi or  Zq2 or  .  .  .  Zql*  or  .  .  .  or  Zqs. Consequently,  individual  n  +  l's 
posterior  distribution  conditional  on the actions of his predecessors,  Ant and 
on his signal realization  Xn+  1  =  Xq,  is 
nl  n2 
WAPq'  171  prob{Z11(j)} 1l7  prob{Z21(j')} 
prob{V  =  vIAn  Xn+ 1 =  Xq'}  =  = l  it= l 
S  nj  n2 
Z  W'PqTl  1 prob{Z 1(j)}  171  prob{Z21(j')} 
1'=1  j=l  j'=l 
(A2) 
where 
prob{Zqi(j)}=  {q  P  if Zq(j)0 
1  q1if  Zql(j)  I  1 
We show that if V =  vj*  then with probability one 
r  1  if l=l* 
lim prob {V  =  vAX+1  =  Xq} =  if 1  1*  (A3) 
n -,  o  ng~~l =  'I = 
0  ifl1  I~l  *. 
The  proof  of  (A3)  is a simple  extension  of  an argument  in DeGroot  (1970, 
pp. 202-4).  Let 
g  [1o(  prob{Zql}) |  ] 
If 1$  1*, then (Al)  and Jensen's  inequality imply that 
Xqi <log  {E[  prob{Zqi  V =  V*]} 
=  log[ S  Pql*  +  (  p  (1  ql] 
-Pql*  I  P~~~ql* 
=  log  1 
=  0. 
Thus  the strong  law of large  numbers  implies  that with probability one 
flog  prob{Zql(j)} 
lim  -  l 
pobog  J/=  Xq1  < 0. 
q  qj=l1 INFORMATIONAL  CASCADES  1019 
Hence 
log  lim  prob{Zql(j)}  =  lim  l  prob=Zql(A  0 
gnq  q  j__  0problZql*  (j)}=li  n  lg  >  =  prbjqI( 
Consequently,  if 1 #  1*, then, with probability one, 
nqprob{Zqi(j)A 
nqlm j 
prob{ZqI*()}  -(A4) 
If n  00  in (A3), then  since  n,  +  n2  =  n,  either n1 --  oo or n2  0? or both. 
Hence,  (A4) and  (A2) imply  (A3). Therefore,  if V =  vI*,  then,  for all E >  0, 
lim  prob{I Vn+  1(Xn+  1;  An)-vI*  I  V n >m}=  1 
Thus assumption  2 implies  that as m  -?  00,  with probability one either individ- 
ual m and  all  subsequent  individuals  will adopt  regardless  of  their  private 
signal  realization,  or  individual  m and  all subsequent  individuals  will reject 
regardless  of  their  private  signal realization.  Q.E.D. 
If assumption  2 is violated  and  v1 =  C for some 1, then  (a proof  similar to 
that of  proposition  1 establishes  that) a cascade  starts if V #  v1. If V =  vI = 
C, then  the  expectation  of  V conditional  on  the actions  of  individuals  i <  n 
approaches  C as n -?  00.  Thus  the expectation  of V conditional  on the actions 
of  individuals  i  <  n and  on Xn may be below  C for lower realizations  of Xn 
and  above  C for  higher  realizations  of  Xn. Therefore,  a  cascade  may  not 
begin. 
Proof of Result 2 
The  proof  is an example  that shows  that if there  is an information  release, 
the second  individual  after  the information  is released  is worse off.  Let V be 
either  zero  or one  with equal  probability  and  the  cost of  adoption  be  .555. 
Let there be three  signal values, Xi E {xl,  x2, X3},  with conditional  distribution 
as  listed  in  table  Al.  It  can  be  readily  verified  that  this  example  satisfies 
assumptions  1 and  2. 
First consider  the  case in which  no  public  information  is released.  Tables 
A2 and A3 list the probability that V =  1 given the first and second  individu- 
als' information  sets, the  unconditional  probability of these  information  sets 
(i.e.,  the  ex  ante  probability  that  a  particular  signal  is observed),  and  the 
individuals' decisions.  Column  1 of table A2 lists the unconditional  probability 
that individual  1 observes  the given signal; Columns  2 and 3 list the posterior 
expected  value  of  adoption  (the  probability  that  V  =  1) and  the  resulting 
action of  this individual. 
Thus  individual  1 adopts  if X1  E {x2, X3}  and rejects if X1 =  x1. Individual 
2 observes  this  decision,  D1 E  {A, R}  (adopt/reject)  and  his  own  signal,  as 
described  in table A3.  Individual  2's ex ante expected  profits without  public 
information  can  be  computed  from  table  A3  to  be  .445(.63  -  .555)  + 
.055(.73  -  .555)  =  .0425. 
Now consider  the following  release of public information.  Both individuals 
observe  a  signal,  S,  that  is  either  high  (H)  or  low  (L) with  probabilities 
Pr(S  =  HIV  =  1)  =  .51  and  Pr(S  =  HIV  =  0)  =  .49. 
Tables  A4  and  A5,  analogous  to tables A2  and  A3,  describe  the  decision 
problems  of  individual  1 and  individual  2, respectively.  As table A4  shows, 1020  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
TABLE  Al 
CONDITIONAL  SIGNAL  PROBABILITY 
X1  X2  X3 
Pr(Xi|V  =  0)  .4  .55  .05 
Pr(Xi|V  =  1)  .2  .7  .1 
TABLE  A2 
THE  DECISION  OF  INDIVIDUAL  1 WITHOUT  PUBLIC 
INFORMATION  RELEASE 
Unconditional  Expected 
Probability  Value  Action 
XI  (1)  (2)  (3) 
XI  .3000  .3333  reject 
x2  .6250  .5600  adopt 
X3  .0750  .6667  adopt 
the  public  information  changes  individual  l's  decision  to  reject if X1  =x2 
and S =  L. Thus  individual  2 can no longer  infer that the signal of individual 
1 was xl  when  he  observes  rejection.  This  changes  the  decision  problem  of 
individual  2.  From  table A5,  the  changed  ex  ante expected  proceeds  of  the 
second  individual  with  public  information  release  can  be  computed  to  be 
.0242(.71  -  .555)  +  .0031(.794  -  .555)  +  .0339(.6454  -  .555)  + 
.22365(.638  -  .555)  +  .02775(.735  -  .555)  =  .03114,  which  is less  than  the 
ex ante expected  proceeds  without public information  release (.0425).  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Result 4 
From equation  (1), the probability that a cascade has not started by n  =  100 
is less than  1/2 100  0. Thus,  by symmetry, 
Pr(up cascade by n =  100)  =  Pr(DowN  cascade by n =  100)  /12.  (A5) 
Also,  equation  (3)  implies  that 
Pr(V =  II  up cascade started in period 2n) 
Pr(V =  ? l  DOWN cascade started in period 2n)  2(P2 - 
)  >  1/2 
(A6) 
and 
Pr(V  =  0  1  uP cascade  started  in period  2n) 
=  Pr(V =  1  I  DOWN  cascade started in period 2n)  =  (2  p)(  P) <  /2.  I  ~~~~~~~~~~2  (p2 -  p +  1)  (7 
(A7) 
Recall that W denotes  the true value after i =  100. Let OD refer  to the event 
that the new value  W is determined  by the old drawing  of V (probability .9), TABLE  A3 
THE  DECISION  OF  INDIVIDUAL  2 WITHOUT  PUBLIC 
INFORMATION  RELEASE 
Unconditional  Expected 
Probability  Value  Action 
DI, X2  (1)  (2)  (3) 
R, xl  .1000  .2000  reject 
R, X2  .1800  .3839  reject 
R, x3  .0200  .5000  reject 
A, x1  .2000  .4000  reject 
A, x2  .4450  .6292  adopt 
A, x3  .0550  .7273  adopt 
TABLE  A4 
THE  DECISION  OF  INDIVIDUAL  1 WITH  PUBLIC 
INFORMATION  RELEASE 
Unconditional  Expected 
Probability  Value  Action 
S, X1  (1)  (2)  (3) 
L, x1  .151  .3245  reject 
L, X2  .31175  .55012  reject 
L, X3  .03725  .657718  adopt 
H, xl  .149  .34228  reject 
H, X2  .31325  .5698  adopt 
H, x3  .03775  .6755  adopt 
TABLE  A5 
THE  DECISION  OF  INDIVIDUAL  2 WITH  PUBLIC 
INFORMATION  RELEASE 
Unconditional  Expected 
Probability  Value  Action 
S, DI, X2  (1)  (2)  (3) 
L, A, xl  .01  .49  reject 
L, A, x2  .0242  .71  adopt 
L, A, X3  .0031  .794  adopt 
L, R, xl  .14176  .313  reject 
L, R, X2  .2847  .537  reject 
L, R, X3  .0339  .6454  adopt 
H, A, xl  .0996  .4096  reject 
H, A, x2  .22365  .638  adopt 
H, A, X3  .02775  .735  adopt 
H, R, xl  .0494  .2065  reject 
H, R, X2  .0896  .3984  reject 
H, R, X3  .01  .5100  reject 1022  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
and let ND  refer  to the event  of  a new drawing  (probability .1). By (A6), 
Pr(W =  lI  up cascade by n =  100) =  Pr(W =  ?  O DOWN  cascade by n =  100) 
P(P +  1) 
=  Pr(OD)  x  +  Pr(ND)  X  1/2 
2(p2 - p+  1) 
p(p  +  1) 
2(p2-p+1) 
>  1/2, 
(A8) 
for all p >  1/2. 
In  order  to  examine  the  decisions  of  the  101st and  later  individuals,  we 
condition  on  new infQrmation (X101,  X102). First, we calculate the probability 
that an up cascade started by period  100 is reversed.  Let E[WI up, H] denote 
E[WIuP cascade by n  =  100, X101 =  H].  Clearly, 
E[W|uP,H]  >E[W|uP]  =  Pr(W =  1luP) >  '/2,  (A9) 
where  the last inequality  follows  from  (A8). Therefore,  after an up cascade, 
if X101 =  H,  then  individual  101 adopts.  Next,  let Pr(v, w, LI  up) denote  the 
conditional  probability  that  V  =  v,  W  =  w, and X101 =  L given  that an up 
cascade started before  n  =  101: 
E[W|uP,L] 
=Pr(W  =  IIuPL) 
-  Pr(W =  1,LIUP) 
Pr(LIuP) 
Pr(1,  1,LIup)  +  Pr(0,  1,LIup) 
Pr(1,  1,LIup)  +  Pr(0,  1,LIup)  +  Pr(1,0,LIup)  +  Pr(0,0,LIup) 
To  illustrate how these  terms are calculated,  we use  (A6) to express  Pr(1,  1, 
L|uP)  as 
Pr(1  1, L I  uP) =  Pr(V =  Il  IuP) Pr(W =  1I  V =  1, uP) Pr(L I  V =  1, W=  1, up) 
= Pr(V=  lIuP)Pr(W=  1|V=  1)Pr(LIW=  1) 
_P(P_+_1) 
2(p2p+  1)95( 
Thus,  using  (A6) and  (A7), we have 
E[W uP, L] 
p(P +  )  (2 - p)(  - p)  051  p) 
)  95(1  - p) +  -p  05(1 
P(Pp2)-/p-P)  +  2(p2 - p  + 1) 
-2(p2 - p  +  iW2(2-  +1 
+  P(P +  1)  05p+  (2-p)(  -  P)95  (Al0) 
+2(p2-  p +1)  0p+2(p2-  p +1)  I95 
(1 -  p)(2  +  16p +  20p2) 
2 +  52p  -  52p2 
.488 INFORMATIONAL CASCADES  1023 
for p  =  .9. Hence, after an up cascade, if individual 101 observes L, he 
rejects.  Subsequent individuals  can infer X101  from individual 101's action. 
It is easily  established  that  E [W  I  up,  L, H] = E [W  I  up], and thus (A9) implies 
that E[WIuP,  L, H] >  1/2. Hence, if individual 101 rejects, that is, X101  =  L, 
then 102 adopts if X102  =  H. On the other hand, if individual 102 observes 
L after 101 rejects, then 102 rejects because 
E[W|uP,L,L]  <E[WIuP,L] <  1/2, 
where the last inequality follows from (A10). Thus if 101 rejects, then X102 
is inferred from 102's action (H if adopt, L if reject). Moreover, if 101 and 
102 reject, a DOWN  cascade starts since 
E[WIuP,L,L,H]  = E[WIuP,L]  <  1/2. 
The intuition for these results is that a cascade  contains little information to 
start  with, so new information can easily reverse the information  reflected in 
the old cascade. Thus the conditional probability  of a change in convention 
to DOWN  after n  =  100 given  an up cascade initially is at least 
Pr(DowN  after  n  =  100 I  up before  n  =  101) 
?  Pr(X101  =  L, X102 =  LIuP) 
=  .9[Pr(V=  IIuP)Pr(L,LIV=  1,uP)  +  Pr(V=  01uP)Pr(L,LIV=  0,up)] 
+  .1 Pr(L,LIND) 
=  [p(p  +  1)(l  -  p)2  +  (2-  p)(l  -  p)p21  (All) 
2(p2-p+  1)  J 
+  .1 [1/2Pr(L,L  I  W =  1) + 1/2Pr(L,  LI  W =  0)] 
=  9 pb(l -p)(l  + 2p -  2p2)]  + .05[(1 -  p)2  +  p2] 
= .0935 
for  p  =  .9. 
A symmetric  argument  establishes  that a DOWN  cascade before  n  =  100 is 
reversed  if  X101  =  X102  =-H  and  that 
Pr(up after n =  101 | DOWN  before n =  101)  (A12) 
?  Pr(X101  =  H, X102 =  HI up)  =  .0935. 
Hence,  for p  =  .9,  a lower  bound  on  the  probability of  a cascade  reversal 
after period  101 is 
Pr(cascade reversal after  100) 
2  Pr(X101  = L,X102 = Liupbefore  101)Pr(upbefore  101) 
+  Pr(X101 = H,X102 = HIDOWNbefore 101)Pr(upbefore  101) 
=  .0935  x  '/2  +  .0935  x  '/2 
=  .0935, 
where  the  first equality  follows  from  (A5),  (Al 1), and (A 12). Q.E.D. 1024  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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